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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

OUTSIDE SYSTEM  
ACTION

17 March 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER  
FROM: PETER JESSUP  
SUBJECT: Proposed Restrictions on  
Reconnaissance Operations Prior to  
and during Presidential Visit to  
USSR

I think the memorandum for the President (Tab A)  
fits the bill.

General Vogt's chart per your request is attached  
at Tab B, but I don't think it is of interest to  
the President.

Attachments

Tabs A and B

Concur (7-day version):  
H. Sonnenfeldt

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JCS review(s) completed.

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MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*  
SUBJECT: Proposed Restrictions on Reconnaissance Operations  
Prior to and during Presidential Visit to USSR

The Joint Reconnaissance Center of the Defense Department proposed to the 40 Committee on 16 March 1972 that the following restrictions be implemented seven days prior to the President's departure for the USSR until his return to the USA:

No reconnaissance flights targeted against the USSR will be conducted in the following standard operating areas:

- a. Across the Soviet Arctic Littoral from the Norwegian/USSR border to the U.S.-Russian Convention Line of 1867.
- b. Within 100 n.m. of Soviet territory in the northern Pacific from Bering Strait to Japan.   
In no case would flights depart from the standard procedure of no closer approach than 40 nautical miles.)
- c. Sea of Okhotsk
- d. Sea of Japan north of 42°17" (except for the tip-off missions mentioned above).
- e. Baltic Sea within 60 n.m. of Soviet territory.
- f. No operations, surface or air, are being considered for the Black Sea.
- g. The JRC proposed prohibiting all overflights of Cuba, but I stated that you would not buy this and the U-2R flights should continue as scheduled.

h.

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1. No concurrent overlapping operations by two or more reconnaissance platforms will be authorized in the Baltic, Sea of Japan, or northern Pacific areas.
- j. The following operational limitations will apply to all military ships and aircraft:
  - (1) Ship-to-ship: 2000 yards closest point of approach unless initiative is Soviet.
  - (2) Aircraft-to-aircraft and aircraft-to-ship: 1000 feet closest point of approach unless initiative is Soviet.
- k. All temporary restrictions will be automatically rescinded upon the return of the President to the USA.

The discussion made the following points: There is no existing or persistent problem in the peripheral reconnaissance of the USSR--it has been continued for many years; the standdown is a gesture of good faith and is an extra precaution to avoid any untoward accident or mishap which would be used politically to mar the visit.

The only variance of opinion occurred when Mr. Irwin for State urged that three days prior to the departure was insufficient time; an "accident" the fourth day prior to the trip would be just as damaging.

Assuming a three-day prior restriction plus a seven-day visit, the JRC estimates 72 missions lost; with a seven-day prior restriction 84 missions would be lost; and with a 10-day prior restriction 97 missions would be lost. Hence, we are just playing with numbers.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the proposed JRC self-imposed restrictions listed above and the seven-day prior departure clause.

APPROVE

*[Signature]*  
3/20/72

DISAPPROVE

OTHER

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3/22/72

Elizabeth--

Since the approval by higher authority was noted in the minute dated 3/20/72, no distribution has been made of this memo except to Mr. Ratliff.

NOTE: The memo was originally prepared recommending a three-day departure clause; Gen. Haig asked that it be changed to seven days.

Thank you,

Evelyn